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1 Introduction 
Episodes of uneven development and overtaking between regions are not exceptional. Belgium 
is an interesting case in point. In 1950 Belgium's industrialized southern region still had a 
GDP per capita of 114% relative to its more rural northern neighbor. However, technological 
change made many of the traditional heavy industries obsolete. Plastics and lighter metals, for 
instance, succesfully substituted for steel in many of its applications. These new industries got 
attracted to the northern region by its low wages, whereas the southern part of the country 
started losing ground. By 1960 the relative GDP per capita ofthe southern region had dropped 
to 104%, and this figure plunged further to 74% by 1990. 
However, technological change does not always spell bad fortune for advanced high-
wage regions or countries. Japan, for instance, building on its strength in cameras, succesfully 
moved into copiers and fax machines (Porter, 1990). In spite of its high wages, the expertise 
and skills of its lab or force gave it a clear advantage in those new industries. Given that 
skills are at least partly technology- or sector-specific, the ease of re-allocating labor from 
one technology (or sector) to another depends on the degree of similarity between the two 
technologies. 
When does technological change cause leapfrogging between regions? And when, on 
the contrary, does it reinforce a region's leading position? Before addressing these questions, 
a more fundamental problem needs to be answered: how did regions with similar technologies 
and preferences develop differently in the first place? This paper proposes a framework that 
analyzes these issues by formalizing the links between technological change, skill specialization 
and regional development. 
We consider an economy with two regions, East and West, and two sectors, food and 
manufacturing. Although labor is the only factor of production, there are two types of skills, 
which are imperfect substitutes. Each region is populated by a continuum of overlapping 
agents. Endowed with perfect foresight, agents make an irreversible skill investment when they 
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are born by choosing between manufacturing and food skills. There are localized externalities 
in the acquisition of manufacturing skills; in each region, the greater the fraction of the labor 
force employed in manufacturing, the easier it becomes to acquire manufacturing skills. A 
slight difference in the concentration of manufacturing skills across regions is therefore enough 
to start off a spiral of uneven development, and over time the economy diverges into a rich 
manufacturing and a poor agricultural region. 
The introduction of a new manufacturing technology may either switch around or 
reinforce the existing development pattern. A region's attractiveness as a location for the new 
industry depends not only on its wage level, but also on the productivity of its existing skills 
when applied to the new technology. This gives rise to two possible, opposite scenarios. If the 
richer region's skills fit the needs of the new technology well, the new industry is adopted in the 
advanced region in spite of its higher wages. Externalities then encourage future generations in 
that region to increasingly specialize in the new technology, so that regional wealth differences 
get reinforced. If not, the new industry locates in the backward region, taking advantage of 
the lower wages. The lock-in of this specialization pattern then leads to the industrialization 
of the lagging region, which eventually overtakes the richer region. 
This paper is closely related to the literature on trade and uneven development in the 
presence of external economies. It more particularly draws on the work of Brezis, Krugman 
and Tsiddon (1993), who propose a two-region two-sector model, where learning-by-doing 
drives uneven development. When then a new technology is introduced, it gets adopted in the 
low-wage region, so that leapfrogging occurs. We depart from Brezis et al. in two important 
ways. 
First, we believe there is no compelling reason why technological change should always 
benefit the low-wage region. As suggested above by the Japanese case, the advanced region 
may very well remain in the lead if its skills are more suitable to the new technology. Other 
examples of this phenomenon include Ireland, Scotland and Israel, where a high proportion of 
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English-speaking engineers have contributed to the emergence of high-tech clusters. Similar 
conclusions are reached by Carlton (1983) in a formal study of start-up firms in SMSAs; he 
finds that existing concentrations of people with specific skills matter a great deal in the choice 
of firm location. 
Second, the learning-by-doing externality in Brezis et al. extends to the entire regional 
lab or force, so that all workers of a given region are identical. Apart from being at odds 
with the micro-evidence on seetor-specific skills,1 it allows Brezis et al. to completely sidestep 
the issue of forward-looking behavior. Since in their model all knowledge is disembodied, an 
agent's skill is independent of her own decisions, so that there is no need to be forward-looking. 
We amend this shortcoming by introducing optimizing agents who decide in which type of skill 
to invest. 
By investing in a specific skill, an agent limits her mobility between sectors and thus 
incurs a sunk cost. Although sunk costs imply that agents should be forward-looking, the 
older trade literature on sector-specific factors of production has generally focused on myopic 
Marshallian adjustment processes: in Mussa (1974), for instance, capital moves slowly to 
the sector where the current real return is higher. As pointed out by Krugman (1991), one 
reason for assuming Marshallian dynamics is to avoid expectational problems and multiplicity 
of equilibria, which typically arise when perfect foresight is introduced (Matsuyama, 1991). 
Apart from the additional complexity, the existence of multiple equilibria make comparative 
statics impossible. 
Interestingly, in spite of introducing perfect foresight, there is no role for expectations in 
our model; the outcome is completely history-dependent. This result holds because the source 
of the externality is the fraction of the region's lab or force currently employed in manufacturing. 
Therefore, no matter what expectations agents have about the future, the region with the bigger 
lSee the empirical literature on the mismatch between the demand and the supply of specific types of lab or 
(e.g., Jackman, Layard and Savouri, 1991, and Bean and Pissarides, 1991). 
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manufacturing sector always benefits from a greater externality. The problem of expectational 
equilibria arises in many other models because externalities are generally modeled to enter 
the production function. In that case, one region or the other may have a greater externality, 
depending on expectations. 
A crucial assumption in our model needing some additional justification is the localized 
externality in the acquisition of skills; in each region, learning manufacturing skills becomes 
easier as more people produce manufactures. The more general assumption of localized exter-
nalities in the acquisition of human capital is common in the literature on endogenous growth 
(Lucas, 1988) and urban economics (Benabou, 1993). We make a more specific assumption 
though, by claiming that localized externalities also apply to particular types of skills. Marshall 
(1890) already noted the importance of this phenomenon when observing that children learn 
local skills "unconsciously.,,2 More recently, Porter (1990) has provided compelling anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that regions tend to have superior schooling in the specific skills used by 
local industry. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 sets out the building 
blocks of our two-region economy and shows how externalities in the acquisition of skills can 
lock in the specialization pattern, causing uneven development. In Section :1 the introduction 
of a new technology may reinforce or reverse the existing development pattern. Section 4-
concludes and suggests some possible extensions. 
2 Skills specialization and uneven development 
2.1 The static economy 
Consider an economy with two regions, East and West, and two sectors, food and manufactur-
ing. By convention, variables with a star ("*") will denote the West, and unstarred variables 
2Marshall (1890), op.cit., !V.x.3. 
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will indicate either the East or will be common to both regions. The East and the West have 
identical labor forces: 
L = L* = 1 (1) 
Workers are mobile between regions.3 Although labor is the only factor of production, some 
workers have food skills and others have manufacturing skills. In the static economy the 
distribution of skills is taken as given. 
Both sectors operate under perfect competition. Food and manufacturing are charac-
terized by simple linear C.R.S. technologies. In the East the aggregate production functions 
of food and manufacturing are, respectively: 
QF = L~ + L';(l- 8) 
QM = A(LM + L~(l - 8» 
(2) 
(3) 
where Q F and Q M denote the quantities of food and manufactures; L~ is the labor force 
with skill i employed in sector j;4 and A represents a productivity factor. The aggregate 
production functions in the West have an identical shape. As can be noted from (2) and (3), 
workers with manufacturing and food skills are imperfect substitutes. In the manufacturing 
sector the productivity of food-skilled agents is a fraction 8 lower than the productivity of 
their counterparts with manufacturing skills; similarly, in the food sector manufacturing-skilled 
workers are a fraction 8 less productive than food-skilled workers. 
Since the price of food can be normalized to 1 and the labor market is perfectly com-
3However, it will turn out that nobody ever has an incentive to migrate, since wages of workers with identical 
skills equalize across regions. 
4From now onwards, superscripts (lower-case) denote a "skill type", whereas subscripts (upper case) indicate 
a "sector" or a "product". 
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petitive, Eastern wages in the food and the manufacturing sector are, respectively: 
wt = 1 wIJ = 1 - () (4) 
(5) 
where w; is the wage of a worker with skill i employed in sector j, and PM is the price of 
a manufactured good. In the absence of transaction costs, free trade equalizes prices across 
regions so that wages for identical workers also equalize. 
PM 
1-0 A f--------...J 
A(Lm+Lm.) 
U+U· 
Relative Supply 
Relative Demand 
Manufactures 
Food 
Figure 1: Demand and supply of manufactures relative to food 
The relative supply of manufactures can easily be derived (Figure 1), since agents 
maximize wages. Given that manufacturing and food skills are imperfect substitutes, agents 
generally work in the sector that corresponds to their skills, so that the relative supply of 
manufactures is A(~;++L~7·). However, if the manufacturing price drops to I j/, agents with 
manufacturing skills become indifferent between working in either sector; if the price falls 
even further, manufacturing production disappears altogether. Similarly, if the price rises to 
A(Lo)' agents with food skills may work in either sector; above that price, food production 
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ceases completely. 
The relative demand of manufactures depends on consumers' preferences, which are 
chosen to be Cobb-Douglas. Consumers spend a fixed share f.L of their income on manufactures 
and the rest on food, so that: 
(6) 
where CM and Gp denote the consumption of manufactures and food. 
The equilibrium manufacturing price can now be derived by equating relative demand 
and relative supply. If, as in Figure 1, relative demand crosses relative supply in its vertical 
portion, i.e., if all agents work in the sector that corresponds to their skills, the price can simply 
be obtained by plugging the relative production of manufactured goods A(~;++:;7') into (6). 
However, if the number of manufacturing-skilled workers in the economy is rather large, the 
supply schedule shifts rightward and intersects the demand curve where the price is at its lower 
bound. In that case some of the agents with manufacturing skills produce food. Similarly, the 
price reaches its upper bound if there are relatively few agents with manufacturing skills in 
the economy. The full expression of the manufacturing price is therefore: 
PM= 
1 
A(I-0) 
1-0 
""A 
(7) 
As mentioned before, ifthe price is at its lower bound, some workers with manufacturing 
skills are employed in the food sector. The exact number of those workers is easily determined 
for the economy as a whole;5 however, how many manufacturing-skilled agents switch to food 
SIt suffices to plug the relative total production of manufactured goods (taking into account that a yet 
undetermined number of manufacturing-skilled workers produce food) into (6), and set the price in (6) equal to 
1~9. It is then easy to solve out for the number of manufacturing-skilled workers who are employed in the food 
sector. 
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in each region is indeterminate. It is important to resolve this indeterminacy, since the localized 
externalities we focus on in the dynamic model depend on employment in manufacturing in 
each region. We therefore make the following tie-breaking assumption: 
Assumption I If there is more than one allocation of skills across sectors, that allocation is 
chosen which minimizes trade between the two regions.6 
The same assumption applies when the price is at its upper bound, and some workers with 
food skills are employed in the manufacturing sector. This concludes the derivation of the 
economy's static equilibrium. 
2.2 The dynamic economy 
Dynamics are introduced by the skills decisions of new generations.7 This is a continuous-time 
model, where each region is populated by a continuum of overlapping agents. Every agent 
faces a constant probability of death 5 throughout her life-time. Assuming that the population 
in each region remains constant, this implies that at each moment in time 5 people die and 5 
are born. At the beginning of life each agent decides which skill to obtain by maximizing her 
life-time utility. Before turning to the agent's optimization problem, several assumptions are 
introduced: 
• (AI) As in Matsuyama (1991), the skill investment is irreversible; no retraining is allowed 
in the model. 
• (A2) The cost of obtaining manufacturing skills for an agent born at time t decreases 
in the number of people in her region working in the manufacturing sector. The idea 
that the transmission of skills is facilitated through localized human contact has been 
discussed in some detail in the introduction. Although we have mentioned before that 
6 A similar argument is used by Helpman and Krugman (1985) to determine the degree of decentralization 
in multinational corporations. 
TSome of the techniques in this section follow Matsuyama (1991). 
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workers never have an incentive to move between regions, agents might want to migrate 
in order to acquire skills. This possibility is not considered in our model; agents benefit 
exclusively from the externality in the region where they are born . 
• (A3) The cost of education is modeled as a simple reduction in the agent's life-time 
utility, rather than as a specific financial investment . 
• (A4) As life-time real income increases, the disutility from investing in education be-
comes greater. This income effect means that when you become richer, you become more 
reluctant to "suffer" through the education process.8 
We now return to the agent's maximization problem. An agent born in the East at time t 
chooses manufacturing skills if and only if she gets a higher expected discounted life-time utility 
from manufacturing skills than from food skills: 
[ max 100 CM (s)IlCp (s)l- lle- p(s-t)ds - gm(t) 
{CM(S),cF(S)ls~t} t 
s.t. PM(S)CM(S) + Cp(s) = wm(s) Vs ~ t] 
> 
[ . max 100 CM (s)IlCp(s)l- lle- p(s-t) - El (t) 
{CM(S),cF(S)ls~t} t 
s.t. PM(S)CM(S) + Cp(s) = wf(s) Vs ~ tj (8) 
where Em(t) and El (t) are the utility costs of acquiring manufacturing or food skills for an 
agent born at time tj wm and w f are the wages of agents with manufacturing or food skillsj 
and p is the agent's discount rate.9 We do not allow for savings, so that budget constraints 
are binding at all times. 
8The last two assumptions have been made to keep the algebra tractable. 
9 As pointed out by Matsuyama (1991), the agent's rate of time preference is p - 6. 
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Before solving the optimization problem, we must specify the exact expressions for wm 
and wl. Although an agent with a specific skill may work in different sectors, Cobb-Douglas 
preferences ensure that an agent's wage is always equal to the wage she would earn in the 
sector that corresponds to her skills, so that w m = APM and wl = 1.10 
The agent's maximization problem (8) boils down to choosing manufacturing skills, 
rather than food skills, if this yields a higher discounted real life-time income net of the cost 
of education. For simplicity, it is assumed that obtaining food skills is free. ll Following (A3), 
the cost of acquiring manufacturing skills decreases in manufacturing employment; moreover, 
in accordance with (A4), that cost is a fraction of an agent's real life-time income. Denoting 
that fraction f3(1 - LM(t)), an agent born in the East at time t chooses manufacturing skills 
if and only if: 
(1- f3(1- LM(t))) 100 ApM(S) e-p(s-t)ds > 100 _1_e- p(s-t)ds 
t 4>(s) t 4>(s) (9) 
where 4> is the price index. Condition (9) can easily be re-written as: 
(10) 
where WM(t) is simply the discounted real life-time income from manufacturing skills rela-
tive to food skills. The role of the localized externality is now clear: as more people work 
in manufacturing, the inequality (10) becomes less stringent, so that an agent is more likely 
to specialize in manufacturing skills. Since all agents are identical at birth, the fraction of 
new-born in the East that go into manufacturing skills at time t is:12 
l°Take, for instance, the case of workers with food skills employed in manufacturing. Cobb-Douglas preferences 
imply that there are always some agents with food skills still employed in the food sector. It therefore follows 
that workers with food skills face the same wage in both sectors. 
llThis does not undo assumption (AI): the acquisition of food skills is still irreversible. 
12When agents are indifferent between both skills, the skill distribution does not change. 
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1 if WM(t) > 1-.B(1!LM(t)) 
r(t) = Lm(t) if WM(t) = 1-.B(1!LM(t» (11) 
0 if WM(t) < 1-.B(1!LM(t)) 
Agents in the West solve the same optimization problem, with the difference that the 
cost of acquiring manufacturing skills depends on LM, rather than on LM. The laws of motion 
of the number of skilled manufacturing workers in the East and the West are then: 
tm(t) = 8(r(t) - Lm(t)) 
tm*(t) = 8(r*(t) - Lm*(t)) 
(12) 
(13) 
The first term in (12) and (13) is the "entry" term, i.e., the agents of the new generation 
who choose manufacturing skills; the second term is the "exit" term, Le., the workers with 
manufacturing skills who die. Defining OM = In WM and applying Leibnitz' rule, we can write 
the law of motion of the co-state variable OM: 
nM(t) = a(t)(WM(t) - ApM(t)) (14) 
where a(t) = 1too PM~H:(t~(. t)ds' The economy's equilibrium can now be formally defined as: 
Definition 1 For a given initial distribution of skills, an equilibrium of the economy is defined 
as any path satisfying (12)-(14), where OM(t) E [In 1 - (J, In (1:8)], "It ~ O. 
The three equations (12)-(14) define a dynamical system in (Lm,Lm*, OM) on [0,1] x [0,1] x 
[In 1- (J, In (1:8)] where the initial value of OM has to be chosen to make the path consistent 
with the equilibrium defined above. For given initial values (Lm(o), Lm*(o)) the number of 
OM(O) satisfying Definition 1 equals the number of possible equilibria. Although there are 
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multiple steady states in this economy (Proposition 1), there is only one equilibrium path 
corresponding to any given initial condition (Lm(o), Lm*(o» (Proposition 2). 
Proposition 1 If () > (3 > 0 and 1/2 < J1. ~ 2~.B' there are three possible steady states: one 
where both regions produce both goods, and two where both regions are fully specialized. 
Proposition 2 Under the parameter values of Proposition 1: 
(a) If Lm*(o) > Lm(o) (initial conditions), then in steady state the West is completely special-
ized in manufacturing skills, and the East in food skills. 
(b) If Lm*(o) < Lm(o) (initial conditions), the reverse applies. 
The dynamics in this model involve a system of three non-linear differential equations for 
which there are no ready-to-use solutions. Instead, we need to rely on more involved analytical 
methods, similar to the ones used, for instance, by Gale (1996). Though the formal proofs are 
provided in the appendix, it is useful to explain the main results verbally. 
Under the given parameter values13 there are three possible steady states: one is in-
terior, and the other two correspond to full specialization in both regions. Which one of the 
steady states is reached depends solely on history. Suppose the West starts off with a slightly 
greater supply of manufacturing skills than the East. Initially both regions are at comparable 
levels of development, since their skill distributions differ only marginally. The West's small 
advantage in manufacturing skills gets locked in as agents in that region increasingly specialize 
in manufacturing. This process leads the economy into a spiral of uneven development. In 
steady state, the West is fully specialized in manufacturing and the East in food; the relative 
utility or income per capita is then: 
U* J1. 
-=--
U I-J1. 
(15) 
13Some of the parameter restrictions require further explanation: (3 > 8 limits the number of equilibria to 
three, and thus increases the tractability of the model; 1/2 < J.' < 2~i3 ensures full specialization. 
13 
Since 1 > J.L > 1/2, it is clear that the West has a higher per capita utility (and income) level. 
In spite of the higher wages in the manufacturing sector, new generations in the East continue 
to specialize in food because the cost of acquiring manufacturing skills is prohibitively high. 
One interesting aspect of this model is that the outcome is completely history-dependent, 
in spite of perfect foresight. The intuition underlying this result can be clarified by considering 
the agents' decision rules: agents born at time t in the East choose manufacturing skills if 
WM{t) > l-(l-JLM(t»i their counterparts in the West do the same ifWM{t) > l-(l-JLie(t»' 
Therefore, if LM{t) > LM(t), the externality in the East is greater than in the West, irrelevant 
of expectations of future wages and prices.14 This stands in contrast with models where the 
externality affects future productivity. In Matsuyama (1991) for instance, future productiv-
ity in the manufacturing sector depends on the future fraction of the labor force employed in 
manufacturing. Therefore, expectations about the future determine which region specializes 
in manufacturing, and we get the typical result of multiplicity of equilibria associated with 
perfect foresight. The irrelevance of expectations in our model reconciles myopic expectations 
and perfect foresight in the sense that both assumptions give identical steady state results. 
3 Technological change: reinforcing or reversing development 
patterns? 
3.1 Initial location of the new technology 
In this section a new superior manufacturing technology is exogenously introduced: A' > A. 
This innovation can be interpreted in two different ways. It could either be a new technology 
that produces the same good, such as the mini-mill technology replacing the integrated steel 
plant; or it could be a new technology that produces a perfect substitute for the original 
14It may seem odd that these decision rules refer to workers employed in manufacturing, whereas Proposition 
2 refers to workers with manufacturing skills. As becomes clear in the proof, this turns out not to be a problem 
since in general L m > Lmo implies LM > Lie. 
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manufactured good, such as the replacement of steel by plastics and composite materials. IS 
Whether this new technology is initially adopted in the East or the West depends on two 
factors: the present wage level and the adaptability of skills in both regions. On the one hand, 
the new industry might be attracted to the region where wages are low, as suggested by Brezis 
et al. (1993). On the other hand though, skills in the rich region may be closely related to the 
needs of the new technology, in which case the innovation gets adopted in the West in spite of 
its higher wages. 
Labor productivity in the new manufacturing sector is optimized if it uses a new type 
of skill, different from both food and "old" manufacturing skills. The closer related the " old" 
manufacturing skills are to the "new" manufacturing skills, the higher the productivity of 
agents with "old" manufacturing skills in the new sector; the same applies to the distance 
between food and "new" manufacturing skills. This idea can be represented graphically by a 
skills line: 
new old 
food manufacturing manufacturing 
I ~
0 0' 0 
The distance between food and old manufacturing skills is 0, since using food (old manufac-
turing) skills in the old manufacturing (food) sector lowers productivity by a fraction O. We 
assume that the new manufacturing skill is located somewhere in between the two original 
skills, at a point 0'. 
At the time the new technology is introduced, the entire labor force in the West is 
specialized in "old" manufacturing skills, whereas all workers in the East have food skills. 
In order to determine which region adopts the new technology, let us view our model as a 
15Since identical goods and perfect substitutes are indistinguishable in the consumer's utility function, both 
interpretations are equivalent from a modelling perspective. 
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Ricardian trade model. Instead of considering skills to be different and technologies to be 
identical across regions, we can view skills to be identical and technologies to be different. 
In other words, the only factor of production is labor, 16 and its productivity in the different 
industries in the East and the West is: 
East West 
Food 1 1- 0 
Manufacturing A'(I- 0') max[A,A'(I- (0 - O'))J 
As explained above, the productivity of the new manufacturing technology in a given region 
depends on the distance between its skills and new manufacturing skills. 
The West adopts the new technology if: 
A'(I-(O-O'))>A (16) 
In other words, the West switches to the new technology if old and new manufacturing are 
sufficiently closely related; otherwise, it simply continues to produce manufactured goods using 
the old technology. Either way, the West retains its comparative advantage in manufacturing, 
given that its relative productivity in manufacturing is higher than that of the East. 
The East, for its part, becomes partially specialized in manufacturing if its workers can 
earn a higher wage by adopting the new technology: 
PMA'(1 - 0') > 1 (17) 
Given that the manufacturing price depends on whether the West has adopted the new tech-
nology or not, PM = '0 max[A,A,h-(8-8')))' This allows us to re-write condition (17) as: 
A'(1 - 0') > 1 - J.t max[A, A'(1 - (0 - O'))J 
J.t 
(18) 
16Note that this particular interpretation is only possible if all agents in a given region have the same skills. 
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In other words, the East adopts the new technology if the initial wage difference 0 is large or 
if food and manufacturing skills are closely related; otherwise, it remains completely specialized 
in food. 
In the next two sections we will see how the initial location of the new industry may 
get locked in, thus affecting the long-run development of both regions. 
3.2 Reversal of the development pattern 
Consider the case where wages in the East are relatively low and agents in the West are not 
productive enough in the new industry, so that initially only the East adopts the innovation. If 
the externality created by this initial location provides sufficient incentive for future generations 
to choose new manufacturing skills, the East becomes fully specialized in new manufacturing 
and the West reverts to agriculture. In this process the East overtakes the West. 
The story of Belgium and The Netherlands in the first half of the 19th century fits this 
description surprisingly well. At the end of the 18th century the Dutch enjoyed the highest 
consumption per capita on the European continent. They were world leaders in a number 
of industries, such as cotton-printing and paper. Belgium, however, was largely rural and its 
peasantry lived in dismal poverty. Yet, by the middle of the 19th century Belgium had become 
the most industrialized nation on the European continent, and the Dutch had lost many of its 
industries to its southern neighbor .17 
The introduction of a new technology adds an extra sector to the economy: 
(19) 
QM=ALm (20) 
QM' = A'(LM', + L~,(l - 0')) (21) 
17Mokyr (1976) convincingly argues that this occured because of Belgium's lower wages, and not because of 
an advantage in natural resources. 
17 
Note that not each type of worker is present in all production functions. Since we are analyzing 
the case where the West does not adopt the innovation, it is never profitable for agents with 
old manufacturing skills to switch to the new sector; a fortiori workers with new manufactur-
ing skills never use the old technology. Finally, food-skilled agents are absent from the old 
manufacturing sector, and vice versa.18 
The demand side of the economy hardly changes, since old and new manufactures are 
indistinguishable in the consumer's utility function. The manufacturing price is then: 
PM= 
1 
A'(I-IJ') 
-L (2-(L=' +L=·')-L=·) 
I-J.I A'(Lm' +Lm·')+ALm. 
l-IJ' 
AI 
if -'!:..- (2-(Lm' +Lm·')_Lm.) 1 
I-J.I A'(Lm' +Lm·')+ALm. > A'(I-IJ') 
if l-IJ' < -L (2-(Lm' +Lm·')_Lm.) < 1 
A' - I-J.I A'(Lm' +Lm·')+Lm. - A'(I-IJ') 
if -'!:..- (2_(Lm' +Lm.' )_Lm.) l-IJ' 
I-J.I A'(Lm' +Lm·')+ALm. < AI 
(22) 
As before, if the price is at its upper or lower bound, the exact allocation of skills across sectors 
in each region is pinned down by Assumption 1. 
Note that in the price expression (22) there are no workers with old manufacturing skills 
in the East. At the time the new technology is introduced the labor force in the East is fully 
specialized in food skills. Moreover, it is assumed that the productivity of the new technology 
is sufficiently great so that new generations never prefer old over new manufacturing skills: 
Lemma 1 If A'(1 - (3) > A then no agent in the East or the West ever has an incentive to 
choose old manufacturing skills.19 
This lemma implies that new generations choose between new manufacturing and food skills. 
The optimization problem of an agent born at time t in the East therefore simplifies to choosing 
18If the manufacturing price rises too high, agents switch from food to new manufacturing, rather than to 
old manufacturing. If the price drops too low, new manufacturing workers change to the food sector; it can be 
shown that the price never drops far enough to give old manufacturing workers the incentive to move. 
19It suffices to show this result in the extreme case where the entire labor force is employed in old manu-
facturing; even in that case the substantial cost advantage in acquiring old manufacturing is not enough to 
compensate the higher productivity of new manufacturing skills. 
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new manufacturing skills, rather than food skills, if and only if: 
(1- .8(1 - L' (t») 100 A'PM(S) e-p(s-t)ds > 100 _l_e- p(s-t)ds (23) 
M t ifJ( S ) t ifJ( s) 
The fraction of new born in the East that chooses new manufacturing skills at time t is: 
1 if WM,(t) > l-.B(l!LM,(t» 
r' (t) = Lm' (t) if WM,(t) = l-.B(l!LM,(t» (24) 
0 if WM,(t) < l-.B(l-~M'(t» 
where W M' is now the relative discounted life-time income of a worker with new manufacturing 
skills. The laws of motion of the dynamic system are then: 
tm'(t) = <5(r(t) - Lm' (t» 
tm*'(t) = <5(r*' (t) - Lm*' (t» 
tm*(t) = -<5Lm*(t) 
nM'(t) = a(t)(WM,(t) - A'PM(t» 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
where OM' = In WM'. The economy's equilibrium can easily be defined by analogy with 
Definition 1. Before deriving the steady state, we impose the extra condition that new manu-
facturing and food skills are not too similar. 
Condition 1 0' > l-y'1-4(1-Jl).BJl 
2Jl • 
If this condition were not to hold, the productivity loss for a food-skilled worker in manufac-
turing would be relatively small, so that everybody would choose food skills in order to take 
advantage of the lower acquisition cost. Skill specialization would disappear and regions would 
become identical. 
For the given initial conditions, there is only one possible steady state: 
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Proposition 3 Under the conditions of Lemma 1 and Condition 1, and given that the new 
technology initially exclusively locates in the East, the economy reaches a steady state where 
the East is completely specialized in new manufacturing and the West in food. 
This result is easily understood. The adoption of the new technology by a number of work-
ers in the East gives new generations in that region an advantage in the acquisition of new 
manufacturing skills. The West, on the contrary, moves into food skills. Over time the East 
becomes increasingly specialized in manufacturing whereas the West goes through a process 
of de-industrialization. Although initially the East still exports food, at some point the trade 
pattern turns around. Eventually the East overtakes the West, and in steady state the per 
capita income (or utility) of the West relative to the East is the inverse of (15). 
3.3 Reinforcement of the development pattern 
In this section we study the case where old and new manufacturing skills are relatively sim-
ilar, so that the new technology gets adopted in the West.20 Eventually the West becomes 
completely specialized in the new manufacturing sector, whereas the East remains trapped in 
agriculture. The regional development gap is thus preserved. 
If workers with old manufacturing skills become more productive by adopting the new 
technology, then the West's labor force switches en masse to the new sector. The old man-
ufacturing industry disappears instantaneously, and the economy is left with two production 
technologies: 
QF = L~ + LI/ (1 - 8') 
QM' = A'(L~, + LM,(I- (8 - 8'» + L~,(I- 8'» 
(29) 
(30) 
It is easy to see that new generations in both the East and the West will never have an incen-
20 Whether the new technology locates exclusively in the West, or in both regions, turns out to be irrelevant. 
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tive to acquire old manufacturing skills. 21 The optimization problem of an agent born at time 
t in the East is therefore equivalent to (23), and the derivation of the laws of motion of the 
dynamic economy is identical to (24)-(28). We can thus immediately jump to the results: 
Proposition 4 Given that the new technology initially locates in the West, the economy reaches 
a steady state where the West is completely specialized in new manufacturing, and the East in 
agriculture. 
The fact that all workers in the West initially adopt the new technology, creates an impor-
tant externality for future generations to acquire those new skills. Over time the West fully 
specializes in new manufacturing, and thus reinforces the existing development pattern. 
4 Concluding remarks and possible extensions 
The purpose of this paper has been to propose a framework to analyze the dynamics of regional 
development. The lock-in of specialization patterns, driven by localized externalities in the 
acquisition of skills, leads to uneven development. However, technological change may change 
the pattern of specialization, and thus lead to a reinforcement or a reversal of the original 
pattern of uneven development. 
We see several promising extensions originating from this work. The framework could 
be used to study the welfare implications of a number of regional policy issues, such as inter-
regional transfers, subsidies to save jobs in declining industries, and inter-regional competition 
to attract new technologies. Another interesting extension would be to analyze the case where 
parents migrate in order to improve the educational perspectives of their offspring. This 
would tend to mitigate regional wage differences and would furthermore give rise to multiple 
equilibria. 
21 Since all workers in the West have adopted the new technology, externalities in the acquisition of old manu-
facturing skills have disappeared; it will thus always be profitable to acquire new, rather than old, manufacturing 
skills. 
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A Proofs of propositions 
LM 
D1 D2 
M 
U1 
U2 
~ _______ ---»-_---l LM" 
Figure 2 Figure 3 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
(Lm*, Lm) is a steady state if it satisfies the conditions tm = 0, Lm* = 0 and n:W = O. Because 
of (14), the latter condition is equivalent to WM = APM, where PM is given by (7). Using 
(11)-(14), this allows us to represent the loci Lm* = 0 and Lm = 0 graphically (Figure 2). 
(Because j3 < (), note that both loci are in the subspace where 1-;/ < PM < A(Le).) 
There is one interior steady state, where Lm* = Lm (because of the symmetry of (11»), and 
there are two corner steady states, where both regions are fully specialized (since 1/2 < JL :S 
2~!3). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
We will limit ourselves to part (b) of Proposition 2, where Lm(o) > Lm*(o). 
Let S == {(Lm*,Lm)\o:s Lm:s 1,0:S Lm*:s 1,Lm* < Lm} denote the feasible set of lab or 
distributions where Lm > Lm*. Define the following subsets (Figure 3): 
M=={(Lm*,Lm)Es\1~() <PM< A(/-())} 
_ {( m* m) S \ 1 L m 1 - () } U1 = L , L E PM = A(1 _ () and 2: 1 _ JL()JL 
U2 == {(Lm*,Lm) E SIPM = A(/- ()) and Lm < 11~ :oJL} 
D1 == {(Lm*, Lm) E SIPM = 1 A- 0 and Lm* < JL } 
1 - () + JLO 
D2 == {(Lm*, Lm) E SIPM = 1 A- 0 and L m* > JL } 
- 1 - 0 + JLO 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
In M all agents work in the sector that corresponds to their skills; in U1 some food-skilled 
workers in the West do manufacturing; in U2 some food-skilled workers in both the East and 
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the West do manufacturing; in Dl some manufacturing-skilled workers in the East produce 
food; in D2 some manufacturing-skilled workers in both the East and the West produce food. 
Note that D = Dl U D2 and U = Ul U U2. 
The initial conditions can be classified in two categories. In each case it is shown that the 
sequence {(Lm*(t), Lm(t))} converges to (0,1): 
• Case 1: (Lm*(O), Lm(o)) E M: 
First it is shown that the sequence can never leave M, once it is in M. (i) If the sequence 
were to enter U, where PM is at its maximum, WM would in the limit go to -00. This 
possibility can be discarded. (ii) If the sequence were to enter D, where PM is at its 
minimum, WM would in the limit go to +00. This possibility can also be discarded. (iii) 
The last way to leave M is to reach Lm = Lm*. However, this is impossible because 
r 2: r*, V(Lm*,Lm) EM. 
Now it is shown that if the sequence ((Lm*(t), Lm(t))} remains in region M, it converges 
to (0,1). We already know that r 2: r*. Since r = r* = 1 would lead the sequence into D 
and r = r* = 0 would lead the sequence into U, it must be that at some point E we have 
r > r*. Then Vt 2: E, r(t) > r*(t). Imagine the contrary. If at some point t > E we had 
r(t) = r*(t) = 0, then it must be that vVM(t) < 0, so that eventually the sequence would 
enter U, a possibility to be discarded. Similarly, if at t > E, we had r(t) = r*(t) = 1, 
the sequence would enter D, which can also be discarded. Therefore, since r(t) > r*(t) 
Vt > E, the sequence {( L m* (t), Lm (t))} converges to the only stationary point in M: 
(0,1). 
• Case 2: (Lm*(o), Lm(o)) E U or (Lm*(o), Lm(o)) E D: 
The sequence must leave U or D and enter M at some point; otherwise W M would go 
to, respectively, -00 and +00. As soon as the sequence enters M, we are back in Case 
1, so that the convergence result holds. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
Two cases are considered: 
• Case 1: j3 < ()': 
First the possible steady states are determined. In steady state nobody has old manufac-
turing skills (Lemma 1). It suffices to replace () by ()' and old by new manufacturing in 
Proposition 1, to see that the possible steady states are identical to the ones in Proposition 
1. 
Now it is shown that at some point Lm' > Lm'*. At time tl when the new technology 
is introduced LM,(tl) > LM,*(tl). This implies that at some point t> tl, we must have 
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Lm' (f) > Lm'*(f). (Otherwise, the whole economy becomes fully specialized in either 
food skills or new manufacturing skills; this possibility can be discarded.) 
Now it is shown that if Lm' > Lm'*, the line Lm' = Lm'* is never reached. If Lm* = 0, 
and Lm' > Lm'*, then the economy is identical to the one described in Proposition 2(b) 
(again, after replacing () by ()f and old by new manufacturing), so that the line Lm' = Lm'* 
is never reached. If Lm* > 0, then this result holds a fortiori. 
Since limHoo Lm*(t) = 0, and Lm' (t) > Lm'*(t) Vt > t, it follows that in the limit the 
economy is identical to the one in Proposition 2(b) (after making the above-mentioned 
changes). In steady state, the East will therefore be completely specialized in new man-
ufacturing skills, and the West in food skills. 
LM 
Figure 4 
(}'(l ()') 
• Case 2: (}f < /3 < -J.L: 
- I-J.L .. 
First, the possible steady states are determined. The loci Lm' = ° and Lm'* = ° look 
slightly different from the ones in Case 1, as can be seen in Figure 4. Even when PM 
is at its maximum (the lower triangle in Figure 4), not everybody finds it necessarily 
profitable to acquire new manufacturing skills; since ()f is lower, food-skilled workers are 
more productive in the new manufacturing sector. That explains the kinks in the loci. 
In spite of that, the steady states are identical to the ones in Case 1. 
Second, in spite of the different condition on /3, the results of Proposition 2(b) (again, 
after substituting ()f for () and new for old manufacturing) go through. This can be shown 
in analogous way as Proposition 2. 
The rest of the proof follows by analogy with Case 1. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
First, the possible steady states are determined. Given that old manufacturing skills disappear, 
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the possible steady states are identical as the ones in Case 1 and Case 2 of Proposition 3. 
It will now be shown that r'*(t) = 1 "It. Define M as the set of feasible skill distributions 
where all manufacturing-skilled workers are employed in new manufacturing and all food-skilled 
workers in food; U as the set of feasible skill distributions where some food-skilled workers 
are employed in new manufacturing; and D as the set of feasible skill distributions where 
some manufacturing-skilled workers are employed in food. At time tl the new technology is 
introduced, and all agents in the West switch from old to new manufacturing so that LM,(tl) = 
1. Suppose r'*(tl) = O. In that case WM,(tt} < 0, so that r'(t) = r'*(t) = 0 'tit ~ tl. That 
would imply WM,(t) < 0 "It ~ tl, which leads to an impossibility as limHoo WM,(t) = -00. 
Therefore r*'(tl) = 1. 
Now it is shown that as long as the sequence ((Lm*(t), Lm'*(t), Lm' (t»} remains in U or M 
and LM, = 1, r'* = 1. Indeed, in order for r'* to drop below 1, WM' < A'PM, so that WM' < O. 
This leads to limHoo WM,(t) = -00, a possibility to be discarded. Therefore, since r'* cannot 
drop below 1, LM, does not drop below 1. 
Since the sequence cannot enter D (otherwise WM , would in the limit go to +00), it follows 
that limHoo Lm'*(t) = 1. Since moreover limt-+oo Lm*(t) = 0, this economy is identical to 
the one in Proposition 2(a) (again, after replacing old by new manufacturing and generalizing 
for a greater range of {3.) Therefore, in steady state the West will be fully specialized in new 
manufacturing skills and the East in food skills. Q.E.D. 
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